Few other decisions regarding jurisdiction of civil court

 United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Sinha, (2008) 7 SCC 454 at page 467

35. Therefore, it is a fundamental presumption in statutory interpretation that ordinary civil courts have jurisdiction to decide all matters of a civil nature. As a corollary,

(i) provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts should receive strict construction (see Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1964 SC 444] andRaichand Amulakh Shah v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1268] ), and

(ii) provisions conferring jurisdiction on authorities and tribunals other than civil courts [see Kasturi and Sons (P) Ltd. v. N. Salivateswaran [AIR 1958 SC 507] andUpper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. [AIR 1963 SC 217] ]

have to be strictly construed. This principle, taken from Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., p. 630, was cited with approval in Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam [(2005) 10 SCC 51 : AIR 2005 SC 2392] .

 Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 681 at page 688

19. But then, even if the right to claim interest on the refunds of excess profits tax could be said to have been preserved, the question yet remains whether a suit for its recovery is at all maintainable. The question turns on the scope of the exclusionary clause in the statute. The effect of clauses excluding the civil court's jurisdiction are considered in several pronouncements of the Judicial Committee and of this Court (see Secretary of State v. Mask & Co [AIR 1940 PC 105] ; K.S. Venkataraman & Co.v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1089 : (1966) 2 SCR 229] ; Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662] ; Premier Automobiles Ltd.v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke [(1976) 1 SCC 496 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 70 : AIR 1975 SC 2238] ). Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil court's jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence. To what extent, and on what areas and under what circumstances and conditions, the civil court's jurisdiction is preserved even where there is an express clause excluding their jurisdiction, are considered inDhulabhai case [AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662] .

Section 9 of CPC

Jurisdiction of civil courts cannot be readily inferred
 Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., (1968) 3 SCR 662: AIR 1969 SC 78: 22 STC 416

35. Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya or Kamla Mills can be said to run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows:

(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.

Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.

(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.

(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.

(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegality collected a suit lies.

(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.

(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.