Few other decisions regarding jurisdiction of civil court

 United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Sinha, (2008) 7 SCC 454 at page 467

35. Therefore, it is a fundamental presumption in statutory interpretation that ordinary civil courts have jurisdiction to decide all matters of a civil nature. As a corollary,

(i) provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts should receive strict construction (see Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1964 SC 444] andRaichand Amulakh Shah v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1268] ), and

(ii) provisions conferring jurisdiction on authorities and tribunals other than civil courts [see Kasturi and Sons (P) Ltd. v. N. Salivateswaran [AIR 1958 SC 507] andUpper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. [AIR 1963 SC 217] ]

have to be strictly construed. This principle, taken from Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., p. 630, was cited with approval in Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam [(2005) 10 SCC 51 : AIR 2005 SC 2392] .

 Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 681 at page 688

19. But then, even if the right to claim interest on the refunds of excess profits tax could be said to have been preserved, the question yet remains whether a suit for its recovery is at all maintainable. The question turns on the scope of the exclusionary clause in the statute. The effect of clauses excluding the civil court's jurisdiction are considered in several pronouncements of the Judicial Committee and of this Court (see Secretary of State v. Mask & Co [AIR 1940 PC 105] ; K.S. Venkataraman & Co.v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1089 : (1966) 2 SCR 229] ; Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662] ; Premier Automobiles Ltd.v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke [(1976) 1 SCC 496 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 70 : AIR 1975 SC 2238] ). Generally speaking, the broad guiding considerations are that wherever a right, not pre-existing in common law, is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right, both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceedings, then, even in the absence of an exclusionary provision the civil court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for its enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil court's jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence. To what extent, and on what areas and under what circumstances and conditions, the civil court's jurisdiction is preserved even where there is an express clause excluding their jurisdiction, are considered inDhulabhai case [AIR 1969 SC 78 : (1968) 3 SCR 662] .